Since I authored those two articles, practically all of the criticism has come from Laurentian elites (a former prime minister described it as "an alarming vision of Canada"!), which illustrates my thesis. Ontarians, in particular, are frequently startled and disappointed that the rest of the country to their west does not behave like a sprawling suburb of Toronto. When their intrusive ignorance produces a predictable backlash—prairie alienation or BC indifference—they emphasize the need for greater political unity. A oneness formed naturally in their own image. It is hardly unexpected that Saskatchewan (and Alberta) have had enough of Central Canadian nationalism and are now advocating for a constitutional split of powers.Saskatchewan is attempting to address an asymmetrical federalism rather than an asymmetrical nationalism, as there is only one nation in Canada. This is a federal model that gives Quebec unique (and mostly suitable) rights within a Central Canadian vision of Canada. Premier Moe is correct to oppose this approach and insist on his province's constitutional rights, especially in the face of a particularly hostile federal government. However, he does not need to pretend to a ridiculous nationhood to accomplish this.Nation or province, all component parts of Canada are entitled to the full measure of their constitutional autonomy, which they are free to exercise or ignore to the extent necessary to achieve their unique goals. The exercises of provincial power required to ensure a nation's objectives may be greater than those required to meet Saskatchewan's regional ambitions, or they may simply differ. However, the one should not impede the other, and a responsible federal government would respect both.
Howard Anglin is a PhD student at Oxford University
He has previously served as Prime Minister Stephen Harper's Deputy Chief of Staff, Principal Secretary to Alberta Premier Jason Kenney, and as a lawyer in New York, London, and Washington, DCThis month marks 60 years since the world peered into the abyss. The Soviet Union was detected attempting to sneak nuclear-tipped missiles into Cuba. In retaliation, over 100,000 US forces were preparing to invade Cuba, and 3000 nuclear missiles were targeted at the Soviet Union.The situation was so severe that experts predicted a one-third to fifty-fifty likelihood of a nuclear war, which would kill 100 million Americans and the same number of Soviets. Moscow instructed Soviet soldiers at home and overseas to put on their uniforms. When death arrived, honor required that they die as heroes. Millions of people from other countries would have died in the crossfire. This was the most perilous period in global history. But Armageddon did not happen. "We lucked out," claimed Robert McNamara, the former US Secretary of Defense. Consider it a black swan occurrence in reverse, meaning it did not result in disaster.The story's outline is widely known. Prior to satellites, American pictures of Cuba in early October 1962 revealed Soviet nuclear short and long-range weapons just 90 miles off the US coast. The Americans got suspicious when they saw soccer grounds in their images, knowing that Cubans play baseball rather than soccer. Over 40,000 Soviet forces had infiltrated Cuba masquerading as tourists and laborers. Over 100 tactical nuclear weapons were now deployed across the country, as well as nuclear-armed ballistic missiles capable of striking deep into North America. It was later established that local Soviet commanders had the authority to launch these missiles without approval from Moscow. This simply increased the danger.
President John F. Kennedy's aides gave him two options
accept the weapons in Cuba and live with the risk, or launch a full air and land assault. Kennedy did neither, but instead imposed a less dangerous naval blockade around the island, preventing hundreds of Soviet ships from carrying additional weaponry. Kennedy was resolved to remove Cuba's nuclear weapons, whether through negotiation or force. To demonstrate that the Americans meant business, Kennedy publicly confronted the Soviets, displaying images of the rockets and demanding their immediate departure. At DEFCON 2, he also elevated the nuclear alert to its highest level, putting American B52s, the backbone of the United States' nuclear bomber fleet, on notice.In the 1960 election, Kennedy ran on the idea that the United States was slipping behind in nuclear weapon capability. This was not true. The Russians had approximately 30 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)1 and accurate intermediate missiles, but no means of delivering them to targets in the United States. Putting them in Cuba was the solution. The United States had 200 ICBMs, dozens of missile-launching submarines, and hundreds of intermediate missiles in Europe and Turkey capable of reaching Soviet targets.The Soviets finally gave up after a thirteen-day confrontation in late October. They realized their mistake.
Premier Nikita Khrushchev wrote to President Kennedy
offering to withdraw the missiles in exchange for removing the blockade and assuring that the United States would not invade Cuba. The Americans agreed. Realizing they needed more to salvage face, Moscow increased their demands in a second Khrushchev letter, requesting that the United States also evacuate its missiles from Turkey. Kennedy agreed but requested that the side agreement be kept secretThe story has another layer that most people are unaware of. There was a third letter, this time from Fidel Castro to Khrushchev, rather than Moscow to Washington. Castro was excluded from direct negotiations between the two superpowers, which enraged the Cuban leader. Castro was certain that, despite American assurances, an American attack was approaching.
.jpg)
.jpg)
.jpg)
Comments
Post a Comment